

## Mid-term Review National Road Safety Strategy 2021-30

### Submission by Transport Professionals Association

Thank you for the opportunity to the Mid-term Review of the National Road Safety Strategy 2021-30. As the peak body representing Australia's transport professionals, we have sought the views of our member for across the country to provide a holistic response from a broad range of professionals involved in various facets of road safety. We would welcome the opportunity to contribute further to advance the achievement of the strategy.

### About Transport Professionals Association

Transport Professionals Association is the peak industry body for transport professionals spanning multiple disciplines, including planning, engineering, modelling, economists, policy specialists, and researchers who work across government, consultancy, industry and academia.

Transport Professionals Association supports members through professional development, networking, advocacy, and knowledge sharing as they deliver safe, sustainable, and thriving transport systems. We represent close to 3,500 members nationally and engage with more than 6,000 professionals every year to advance the transport outcomes for all.

Our transport professionals are critical participants in delivering a sustainable, efficient, accessible and safe transport system. We support a holistic 'Safe Systems' approach covering all transport infrastructure and operations, and the interactions between people, vehicles and the transport environment.

As the peak body representing Australia's transport professionals, we have sought the views of our member for across the country to provide a response to the Mid-term Review of the National Road Safety Strategy 2021-30.

### Survey Responses

The following are our responses to the survey questions.

#### **Q1. In your view, what aspects of the National Road Safety Strategy 2021–30 do you believe are working well?**

Across TPA members there is broad agreement that the Strategy gets a number of fundamentals right. At its best, it takes the long view, aligns with Safe System principles, and puts vulnerable road users closer to the centre of the picture than in earlier national strategies.

Several members highlighted that the Strategy's overall direction toward Vision Zero and a harm-free system by 2050 is appropriate and consistent with world best practice. Having clear national targets and a shared end-state has helped keep governments, agencies and practitioners broadly moving in the same direction, even when progress has stalled. For some members, the existence of a national framework at all is a strength in itself, because it sets expectations and keeps road safety on the agenda across jurisdictions.

Members also pointed to the stronger emphasis on vulnerable road users as one of the most positive shifts. This focus has translated into more pedestrian priority crossings, more raised platforms and growing cycling infrastructure programs. In practical terms, this means people walking and riding are no longer treated as an afterthought to vehicle flow, but as central customers whose safety must be protected. Several respondents noted that this shift is already reshaping designs in local streets and activity centres.

There is also support for the Strategy's use of Safe System principles and the Movement and Place approach. For many practitioners, these frameworks have broadened the conversation from "how do we move cars faster" to "how do we safely move people and goods while supporting the places they live, work and spend time in". One member

commented that the Strategy has “broadened the context in which road safety is considered” by connecting safety to land use, urban design and health outcomes, not only to blackspot engineering.

The Strategy’s commitment to better data and more consistent serious-injury reporting is viewed positively. Members acknowledged recent work to standardise definitions and improve hospital-linked serious-injury data. This is starting to correct the long-standing imbalance where fatality data drove most decisions while serious injury patterns were poorly understood.

At a communication level, several members noted that the Strategy document itself is visually clear and accessible. The language is generally easy to read, the graphics help explain key ideas, and the layout makes it suitable for non-technical audiences. That matters, because a strategy that only specialists can understand is unlikely to shift broader public attitudes.

However, members also stressed that what is “working well” is largely conceptual rather than operational. The Strategy has the right intent and some solid frameworks. The concern is not that these pieces are wrong, but that they are not yet powerful enough to overcome rising pressures on road trauma.

## **Q2. In your view, why do you think the number of deaths and serious injuries on Australian roads are increasing?**

TPA members see the current increase in deaths and serious injuries as the result of multiple pressures all moving in the wrong direction at once, while our responses remain mostly incremental and rooted in the traditional “3 Es” of engineering, enforcement and education.

Several contributors described a simple imbalance: the upward pressures on trauma are stronger than the downward pull of current safety interventions. Traffic volumes have increased with population and economic growth, especially on regional highways and peri-urban roads. More freight is moving by road rather than rail. New travel patterns such as caravanning, gig-economy deliveries and e-rideables have emerged without a matching safety response. One member put it bluntly: “We are doing what we have always done quite well, but the world around us has changed faster than our methods.”

Vehicle trends are also a major factor. Members noted that cars, SUVs and utes are getting larger and heavier, which increases the energy involved in a crash. While many of these vehicles receive high star ratings, they are not necessarily safer for people outside the vehicle. Combined with increased use of heavy vehicles and buses, any crash is more likely to involve high forces and therefore more severe injury outcomes.

Speed remains central. Practitioners stressed that safe speed management has not kept pace with rising exposure. Many high-speed undivided rural roads still operate at 100km/h or above without median separation or wider centreline treatments. A number of members referenced the WA safer speeds trial, which is exploring lower limits on undivided roads, and argued that similar reforms are needed nationally. In cities, vulnerable road users are increasingly exposed on 50–60km/h arterials that function both as through-routes and local streets, particularly around schools and town centres.

Several practitioners emphasised a communication and culture gap. The public often hears about road trauma as large annual numbers which feel abstract and distant. One member suggested that reporting trauma as daily deaths or hourly hospitalisations would make the risk more tangible. At the same time, many people still see crashes as the fault of a small group of “bad drivers”, rather than as a predictable outcome of system design. This mindset reduces public support for evidence-based measures such as lower speed limits, enforcement or vehicle regulation.

There is strong concern about over-reliance on historic crash data. Members pointed out that, in any other safety-critical field, “near-miss” reporting is an essential part of the system. In road safety, near misses are largely invisible. Crashes that do not result in hospitalisation often go unrecorded, and incidents involving people walking or riding are severely under-reported. As a result, we are often “waiting for the bridge to fall down before we inspect it”, rather than acting on early warning signs.

In addition, several members emphasised that reversing current trends requires sustained cultural change beginning far earlier than the licensing system. A Social Model approach would target primary and secondary school environments, reframing safety as a normalised community value rather than an individual responsibility learned only at the learner-permit stage. This aligns with international evidence that early-life norms shape later driving behaviour just as powerfully as enforcement.

Members also noted the system-level relationship between economic conditions and risk exposure. For example, periods

of increased disposable income have coincided with growth in motorcycle purchases, which has historically translated into higher death and serious injury rates. This is a clear example of how upstream socio-economic factors interact with transport choices and injury patterns, yet seldom appear in strategic assessments.

Some members were frank about institutional failures and mixed messaging over the past decade. They noted that, for years, public statements have celebrated reduced rates per capita or per vehicle, while ignoring that absolute numbers of deaths remained high and that progress was flattening from around 2014 onwards. This has contributed to a sense that the situation was under control when, in reality, we were drifting off track from our targets.

Finally, practitioners highlighted that political leadership has not matched the scale of the problem. Unpopular decisions, especially around speed management, have been delayed or diluted. Community resistance to change has often been allowed to outweigh hard evidence about risk. One member observed that everyone knows the “Fatal Five” behaviours, but we rarely talk about the “Fatal System” of road and vehicle standards, funding choices and planning decisions that shape those behaviours in the first place.

In simple terms, trauma is rising because the world has changed, the pressures on the system have increased, and our responses have not yet been transformed to match.

### **Q3. What is your view of the National Road Safety Strategy 2021–30’s themes, priorities, and enabling actions?**

Most TPA members agree that the Strategy’s themes, priorities and enabling actions are directionally sound but incomplete and, in some areas, poorly translated into practice.

On the positive side, the focus on Safe System, safer roads, safer vehicles, safer road use and safer speeds broadly reflects international best practice. The Strategy rightly identifies vulnerable road users, regional and remote communities and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people as key priorities. Members also welcomed the inclusion of the Social Model and Movement and Place as attempts to broaden responsibility beyond road agencies and to link safety to place-making and health.

However, members repeatedly flagged gaps and weaknesses.

The themes are often used to justify continuing traditional approaches rather than driving new ones. A significant portion of implementation still centres on conventional engineering treatments, enforcement and awareness campaigns. As one experienced member commented, “Despite the new language, we are mostly doing what we did for the last 90 years.”

Several respondents argued that equity is missing as an explicit guiding principle. Equity was a major theme at the recent Australasian Road Safety Conference, yet the Strategy only touches on it indirectly via regional and Indigenous priorities. Members stressed that road safety outcomes differ sharply for people on low incomes, for older people, migrants, involuntary non-drivers, and people from diverse cultural backgrounds. Without a clearer equity lens, structural disadvantages are left unaddressed.

Themes pay limited attention to upstream influences such as land use planning, economic policy, workplace practices and migration settings. These shape who travels, how, for what purpose and under what conditions. For example, migrant drivers play a growing role in freight and commercial transport, often working under high pressure with language and systems that do not always support safe work. Mode shift opportunities, such as moving freight to rail or supporting more public and active transport, are mentioned only lightly despite their potential to reduce exposure to crash forces.

Members strongly supported Movement and Place but stressed that the framework now needs practical tools to support implementation. Practitioners specifically requested access to consistent before-and-after case studies, design catalogues and treatment libraries that show how Movement and Place principles can be applied across different land uses, age groups and accessibility needs. Without an applied knowledge base, the framework risks remaining high level and unevenly translated across jurisdictions.

Several members felt that Movement and Place has been given excessive prominence without clear delivery pathways. In some jurisdictions it risks being used almost as a “magic phrase” rather than a practical framework. Without a simple theory-of-change that links Movement and Place to concrete actions like lower speeds, traffic calming and reallocated road space, it may not achieve the safety benefits suggested.

The Social Model is seen as underdeveloped. While the idea of engaging all actors is attractive, members reported that

it has not been translated into robust frameworks for involving sectors such as health, education, insurance, freight, unions and standards bodies. Other safety-critical fields, such as aviation and workplace safety, have more mature models for shared responsibility, safety culture and system learning that road safety could draw on more explicitly.

One response noted that the Strategy references “systems thinking” but rarely operationalises it. As an example, the connection between rising disposable income, higher motorcycle purchases and increased serious injuries illustrates how economic trends can influence trauma. These systemic relationships need to be recognised within the Strategy’s conceptual framing.

Finally, practitioners noted that many enabling actions are difficult to quantify. They lack clear targets, timelines or accountability mechanisms. Without measurable expectations, it is hard to know whether an action is on track or whether a course correction is needed.

In short, the themes, priorities and enabling actions are a reasonable frame but not yet a driver of transformation. They need sharpening, clearer hierarchy, explicit equity, and a stronger link to governance and accountability.

#### **Q4. Do you have any suggestions for actions or initiatives that would better support implementation of the themes, priorities and enabling actions?**

TPA members proposed a wide range of concrete actions. Several themes recur strongly across contributions: clearer targets, better data and transparency, stronger local government support, and broader use of policy levers beyond the traditional 3 Es.

##### **Clearer and more specific targets**

Members want explicit targets for each priority area and each enabling action, not just aggregate national goals such as “50 per cent reduction by 2030”. For example, there should be measurable expectations for reductions in pedestrian trauma, upgrades to high-risk regional corridors, or completion of network safety plans. Annual reduction targets (such as “200 fewer deaths per year”) were suggested as a way to make political accountability more concrete.

##### **Open, transparent and consistent data**

There is strong support for a national crash and serious-injury data standard, covering definitions, formats and reporting cycles. Members argued that all relevant data, including AusRAP results and serious-injury statistics, should be publicly available unless there is a clear privacy reason to withhold it. One member described the reluctant release of AusRAP data as a “glaring example” of the current transparency gap.

Several practitioners called for a national open-data release schedule so that councils, researchers and community organisations can plan analysis and monitoring work. The goal is to move from sporadic, ad-hoc releases to predictable, trusted information flows.

Members recommended strengthening national data frameworks by incorporating summaries of forensic crash investigations, where privacy allows, into public datasets. These reports contain critical insights about root causes, infrastructure conditions and injury biomechanics that rarely reach practitioners outside policing or coronial systems. A national road-safety research database similar in intent to the UK’s National Centre for Accessible Transport open-access model would allow practitioners, academics and communities to draw on a shared evidence base.

##### **Stronger role for local government**

Local governments maintain most of the road network yet often lack the resources, data access and specialist staff required to meet the Strategy’s expectations. Members stressed that implementation cannot succeed unless councils are equipped with modern, practical tools that translate Safe System principles into everyday decision-making.

Members recommended:

- Providing simple map-based tools and dashboards that allow councils to see crash patterns, safety indicators and early-warning signs of emerging risk without needing in-house data teams. Several practitioners highlighted the value of proactive insights such as conflict patterns, movement behaviour and near-miss indicators, which help identify high-risk locations long before a serious crash occurs. These types of analytics are already being used in parts of Australia and overseas, demonstrating how local governments can intervene early when given access to these capabilities.

- Offering structured training and guidance on Safe System assessments, network safety planning and speed management, including how to interpret behaviour and conflict-based risk data alongside traditional crash statistics. Practitioners emphasised that councils respond well when provided with clear, visual evidence of risk for example, showing how vehicles interact at an intersection, where conflicts cluster and how speed affects trajectory and severity.
- Giving councils clearer powers and frameworks to implement lower speed limits where evidence supports them, particularly when conflict-based assessments show that current operating speeds are incompatible with the surrounding land use or vulnerable road user activity. Several members noted that councils often have strong local knowledge but lack the statutory ability to act on it, even when both crash and conflict data point to the same risks.
- Including local government representatives in national governance structures, to ensure the Strategy reflects real implementation conditions. Councils repeatedly expressed that they are expected to deliver Safe System outcomes but are rarely involved in shaping the data, tools or policy frameworks that govern those outcomes.

In short, members highlighted that enabling local government requires more than funding it requires timely access to meaningful risk data, clear authority to act, and the technical support needed to interpret both historic crashes and emerging conflict patterns. When these elements are provided, councils can move from reactive responses to genuinely preventative road safety practice.

### **Broadening the toolkit beyond traditional measures**

Several members recommended that every major government project should include a Safety Impact Assessment that reports projected safety outcomes in real numbers of expected deaths and serious injuries, rather than relying solely on percentage reductions or abstract economic values. Presenting safety impacts in human-centred terms would make trade-offs more transparent and give decision-makers a clearer understanding of the consequences of road expansion, intersection redesign or cost-driven scope changes.

Members also noted that these Safety Impact Assessments should increasingly draw on modern risk diagnostics, not just historic crash data. This includes conflict-based indicators, near-miss patterns and behavioural observations that highlight where speed, trajectory and user interaction create predictable risk. Practitioners emphasised that these proactive insights allow government agencies to identify safety consequences at the design stage, rather than waiting for crashes to reveal them years later. Several jurisdictions both here and overseas are already using such tools to inform business cases, corridor planning and project prioritisation.

There is also strong support for economic and insurance levers to reinforce safer choices. Suggested mechanisms include:

- discounted registration or insurance for safer vehicles or verified safe driving
- subsidies for child restraints, caravan safety training and other proven interventions
- the use of government-owned compulsory third party insurance schemes to fund prevention and early-intervention measures, not just post-crash compensation

Several members argued that enabling actions should include regulatory reform, including mandatory minimum safety standards for heavy vehicles. International models demonstrate that requirements such as underrun protection, direct-vision cab design and intelligent speed assist materially reduce risk to vulnerable road users. Australia's current standards fall behind global best practice, and harmonisation is urgently required.

Members also recommended embedding automated technologies into operations and network management including camera-based detection, collective perception messaging, connected-infrastructure alerts and real-time analytics. These technologies provide objective, continuous assessment of risk across the network and allow earlier, more targeted interventions than periodic manual audits.

Members further suggested the introduction of ongoing driver competence programs, noting that many licensed drivers have never updated their knowledge since passing their test, often decades ago. In other safety-critical industries, regular competency checks are standard. Road use is one of the few high-risk activities in society where lifelong licences exist without structured refreshers, even as vehicles, technology, road rules and travel patterns change substantially over time.



### Governance, evaluation and program quality

Practitioners emphasised the need for better processes for analysis, policy development and evaluation. This includes:

- reviewing whether large road projects actually deliver the safety benefits claimed in their business cases
- rigorously evaluating “education and awareness” campaigns, which are often assumed to work but rarely tested
- modernising governance of technology projects so that multiple states can collaborate with industry and academia on shared platforms.

In summary, members want implementation to be supported by clearer targets, open data, empowered local governments, smarter economic incentives and more rigorous evaluation, so that the Strategy becomes a living system rather than a static document.

### Q5. In your view, what new or innovative road safety actions are needed across Australia to reduce road trauma?

TPA members do not see innovation as “shiny gadgets”. For them, innovation means using better information, smarter tools and new partnerships to identify and treat risk earlier and more fairly.

#### Data, near misses and proactive risk management

A major theme from TPA members is the need for national standards and platforms for near-miss and low-severity incident reporting, recognising that in every other safety-critical industry, near-miss reporting is a foundational practice. In road safety, by contrast, most property-damage crashes and “near misses” effectively disappear from the system. Incidents involving people walking or riding are especially under-reported, meaning many of the most meaningful warning signs never reach decision-makers.

Several members noted that Australia continues to rely heavily on historic crash data, even though crashes are relatively rare events and represent only the visible tip of a much larger risk pattern. Practitioners repeatedly emphasised that modern road-safety management requires us to understand behaviour, interactions and conflicts, not just outcomes. This reflects a broader international shift toward identifying the precursors to serious crashes, the situations where trajectories, speeds and user movements combine to create a predictable risk long before harm occurs.

Members highlighted the need for national research into intersection risk profiles, combining geometry, speed environment, demand and conflict analysis to estimate the probability of fatal and serious injuries for given designs. Such models would allow governments to prioritise redesigns proactively, instead of relying on historic crash records.

Members therefore proposed a national standard for capturing crashes of all severities and near-hits, supported by multiple data sources including self-reporting apps, vehicle telemetry and connected infrastructure. Several also highlighted the role of high-resolution, intersection-level conflict analytics, which are increasingly used in jurisdictions overseas and now emerging in parts of Australia. These analytics help reveal patterns of critical conflicts, abrupt braking, evasive movements and unsafe trajectories that would never be seen in traditional datasets. Subtly put by one practitioner: *“If we only measure harm after people are injured, we will always be reacting too late.”*

Members stressed that the purpose of these tools is not complexity for its own sake, but rather to paint a fuller picture of risk, allowing agencies and councils to intervene early. For example, adjusting speeds, modifying signal phasing or redesigning an approach before a severe crash occurs. This type of proactive intelligence is particularly important for vulnerable users, whose safety concerns are often expressed through daily near-miss experiences rather than through police-recorded crashes.

At the same time, members called for rigorous attention to data quality and validation. As more data types become available including crowdsourced reports, vehicle-generated data and video analytics, a consistent national framework is needed to ensure these inputs are reliable, comparable and used appropriately. Without such standards, there is a risk of acting on noise rather than insight.

In summary, members want road safety to evolve toward proactive, behaviour-informed risk management, where harmful patterns are detected early and acted upon with the same seriousness given to crash records. The consistent message was clear: Australia cannot meet its 2030 or 2050 goals unless near-miss intelligence, conflict analysis, vehicle-generated data, human-reported hazard information and other proactive risk tools become routine parts of the

national road-safety system giving agencies the ability to see the risk emerging, not just measure the harm after it occurs.

### **Technology that supports Safe System outcomes**

Members identified several technology-related innovations:

- wider use of intelligent speed assistance (ISA) and other in-vehicle safety systems, guided by international experience
- dynamic speed management, where speeds change by time of day, weather or land use to match real risk
- better use of vehicle-generated data to understand speeds, braking and conflicts, provided it is handled with proper governance and privacy protections
- connectivity pilots and pre-deployment work under the national CAV Action Plan, with a focus on benefits for vulnerable road users and public transport users.

Practitioners also encouraged integrating collective perception messaging, camera-based sensing and other connected technologies into real-time operations, enabling early identification of high-risk movements and hazardous conditions before they escalate.

They also stressed that technology funding and governance need to be improved. Past cooperative research centres such as iMOVE have helped, but members see a lack of long-term, harmonised investment in safety-oriented technology.

### **Low-cost infrastructure and visual priority for people**

Innovative infrastructure does not always mean large capital works. Members pointed to:

- compact rural roundabouts and other low-cost treatments that have been effective in places such as Mornington Peninsula
- raised pedestrian crossings and side-road priority crossings that give clear visual cues that people on foot have priority
- replicating success such as City of Vincent's 40km/h local-road program and wider Perth inner-city collaboration.

These kinds of treatments are seen as scalable as authorities councils can apply them across many sites rather than at a small number of big projects.

### **Information and alerts for all road users**

Some contributors highlighted the potential of real-time travel information, where navigation apps and in-car systems provide alerts about severe weather, flooded roads, high pedestrian activity areas or school streets. For e-mobility users in particular, clear warnings about dangerous locations and alternative routes could reduce exposure to high-risk environments.

In essence, members want innovation that helps us find risk earlier, act faster and support safer choices, rather than waiting for the next serious crash to tell us where the system has failed.

## **Q6. Are there any international approaches to road safety you believe Australia should consider?**

TPA members believe Australia should both learn from traditional Vision Zero leaders and pay close attention to countries that have achieved recent gains from a lower starting point.

Several respondents mentioned Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands as well-known examples of embedding Safe System principles into law, design standards and investment decisions. However, a number of members also noted that some early leaders have seen their progress plateau since around 2014, suggesting that even strong systems need renewal.

A particularly strong example raised is Wales, which reduced default urban speeds to 20mph (approximately 32km/h). Despite controversy, early evidence shows significant reductions in casualty crashes and insurance claims. For TPA members, Wales demonstrates that whole-of-country speed reform is possible when governments hold their nerve and communicate clearly.

Another example frequently cited is Auckland Transport's safe speeds program, supported by its professional services panel TEPS. Auckland has successfully rolled out numerous raised pedestrian crossings and cycling upgrades as part of a coordinated Safe System approach and has received international recognition for its results. Members see this as a powerful reminder that neighbouring jurisdictions with similar cultures can deliver strong outcomes when speed management, infrastructure and community engagement are integrated.

Some contributors urged Australia to look closely at countries such as Norway, Finland and Japan, which have continued to reduce trauma in recent years without framing their work strictly in Safe System or Vision Zero language as defined by some international bodies. They argued that Australia should ask, "*What exactly are they doing differently, and what can we learn?*"

Members also pointed to European Union vehicle safety regulations, including advanced driver assistance systems and improved direct-vision standards for trucks, as an important benchmark. These regulations explicitly consider the safety of people outside the vehicle. Adopting similar standards, or at least aligning our expectations for imported vehicles, would directly support vulnerable road user safety.

Finally, practices like School Streets and low-traffic neighbourhoods in the United Kingdom and Europe were highlighted. These approaches temporarily restrict vehicle access around schools and residential areas to prioritise walking and cycling. Early evaluations show improvements in safety, reduced congestion and stronger community outcomes.

For TPA members, the lesson from overseas is clear: sustained leadership, lower speeds, strong regulation and proactive network-wide programs are common features in places where trauma continues to decline.

## **Q7. Are there specific road user groups, regions, emerging issues or challenges that you believe require more attention?**

Across TPA members there is strong agreement that the Strategy needs a sharper focus on who is most at risk and who has the least power in the current system.

### **Vulnerable road users and involuntary non-drivers**

Vulnerable road users remain a central concern. Pedestrians, cyclists, motorcyclists and e-mobility users are over-represented in serious injuries, especially on busy urban roads that mix high speeds with local activity. Several members argued that the Strategy should prioritise involuntary non-drivers and vulnerable users first, not drivers, when ordering its priorities. Many people do not have realistic alternatives to walking, cycling or public transport, yet the system is largely designed around private cars.

### **Children, older people and people on low incomes**

Children, older people and those on low incomes were frequently mentioned. School environments often lack consistent safe crossings, continuous footpaths and appropriate speeds. Older people are more likely to experience severe outcomes when crashes occur. People on lower incomes are more likely to live or work in areas with high exposure to traffic and limited safe alternatives.

### **Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and regional Australia**

Members emphasised the need for stronger action in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and across regional and remote areas. High-speed, undivided roads with limited safe roadsides, long travel distances and older vehicle fleets combine to create disproportionate risk. While the Strategy names these as priorities, members do not yet see commensurate action or resourcing.

### **Emerging travel modes and patterns**

E-rideables, gig-economy delivery drivers, caravanners and freight drivers were all identified as groups needing greater attention. These users often operate at the edges of existing regulatory and enforcement frameworks. For example, gig-economy riders may face strong commercial pressure to travel quickly while using shared spaces with pedestrians, and



caravan drivers may operate large vehicles with limited training.

### Vehicle size and emissions

Several contributors highlighted the growing size and weight of private vehicles as an emerging safety and public health challenge. Large SUVs and utes increase the risk to people outside the vehicle and may encourage designs that prioritise vehicle mobility over safe, people-centred streets. Members also called for the Strategy to recognise the health impacts of emissions and non-exhaust particulates as part of a holistic view of road harm.

In summary, members want the Strategy's second half to focus more clearly on those who bear the greatest risk and have the least choice, and to align safety measures with broader equity and health goals.

### Q8. Do you have any specific examples, case studies or experiences that you would like to share as part of your submission? Please provide as much detail as possible.

TPA members offered several examples that illustrate both the challenges and the opportunities of current practice.

- **City of Vincent 40 km/h program, WA:** This initiative, and the broader Perth inner-city group collaboration, has successfully implemented 40 km/h limits on local roads. It shows that local governments can lead speed management reform when given clear frameworks and political backing.
- **Compact rural roundabouts and active rural junction warnings:** Compact roundabouts and "life" warning systems in rural areas have improved safety at a fraction of the cost of full intersection upgrades. These demonstrate how innovative design can stretch limited budgets while still aligning with Safe System principles.
- **Auckland Transport and TEPS:** Through its professional services panel, Auckland has rolled out many raised crossings and cycling improvements as part of a structured Safe System program. This illustrates how long-term relationships with technical partners can support consistent, high-quality delivery.
- **School-area mapping projects:** Members described work where perception and near-miss data around schools revealed much higher levels of risk than official crash records suggested. These projects showed that parents and children often experience daily fear and near-misses that never appear in statistics. When these insights were turned into practical treatments, such as new crossings or lower speeds, community acceptance was high.
- **Truck Friendly caravan safety initiative:** One member pointed to the Truck Friendly program, which supports caravan safety through education and engagement with both truck drivers and caravan owners. This is an example of the Social Model in practice, where community-led initiatives complement formal regulation.
- **Data access for local governments:** Several councils represented in TPA have gained access to simple crash-mapping tools. Once they could see patterns across their own networks, they were able to prepare stronger business cases, prioritise work more effectively and engage councillors and communities with clearer evidence. This experience reinforces the value of open, well-presented data.

These examples underscore a common message: when information is clear, tools are accessible and responsibilities are shared, practical improvements follow quickly.

### Q9. Do you have any other feedback, ideas or comments not already captured?

TPA members provided a number of broader reflections that cut across all questions.

Several practitioners cautioned that the Strategy risks functioning as a "road-crash reduction strategy" rather than a full road safety strategy. Too much emphasis is still placed on crashes as isolated events rather than on the broader system of exposure, speed, vehicle design, land use, emissions and health.

Some members emphasised that legislative reform may be required to embed Safe System principles into governance, accountability frameworks and infrastructure decision-making. Without statutory duties that prioritise safety, agencies can still trade off life-saving design elements against perceived productivity or cost considerations.

Members stressed the need to elevate road safety within government structures. At present, responsibilities are fragmented across portfolios and agencies. The Office of Road Safety is perceived as relatively buried, and parliamentary reporting on progress is limited. Members argued for more regular and frank reporting to parliaments on what is working, what is not, and where more effort is needed.

There is a strong call to rethink how transport projects are appraised and accounted for. If cost-benefit methods consistently favour travel time savings and capacity increases over safety, then safety will continue to lose out. Members suggested that safety outcomes should be treated more like workplace safety obligations: non-negotiable and built into core performance measures.

Contributors stressed that every safety decision must place people and communities at the centre. This includes ensuring that the Strategy addresses not only mobility and crash outcomes but the lived experience of accessibility, safety, belonging and health. When communities are involved early not only consulted after decisions are made safety outcomes tend to be more durable and culturally supported.

There is a desire to learn more systematically from other safety domains such as aviation and workplace safety. Concepts like safety culture, hierarchies of control, and continuous learning are well established elsewhere but only partially used in road safety.

Several members reminded us that storytelling and community engagement matter. Data and models are vital, but change also depends on people understanding why safety measures are introduced and feeling that they are treated fairly. As one member wrote, *"Road safety will not be won from behind computers in our professional, academic and organisational echo chambers. We need people who can relate in clubs, pubs, streets and coffee shops."*

Finally, members reinforced that cultural change remains the linchpin of long-term improvement. Safety cannot be treated as an individual choice; it must become a shared ethic across neighbourhoods, workplaces, schools and government institutions. The professional engineering community, in particular, must view Safe System principles as a non-negotiable duty of care when designing and delivering public infrastructure.

Together, these comments highlight a simple idea: if Australia wants different results, it must broaden who is involved, what levers are used, and how honestly we talk about the problem.

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